Suchergebnisse

The traditional model of initial training of judges in Spain and in other countries has been focused, and is still focused, on the mechanical digestion of a pile of stereotyped notions related to several legal subjects. This knowledge is presented with no references to specific legal disputes and does not meet at all, neither the profile of modern complex constitutional legal systems consisting of several levels, internally changing and conflicting; nor the practice of those systems. It does correspond, however, the historical model of the Napoleonic judge, who tends to act as a mechanical enforcer of the law and the longa manu of the real power rather than guardian of the citizens' basic rights. The alternative to this kind of judicial training would be a system of training incorporating a high quality operative knowledge of the positive law actually in force, together with a theoretical-philosophical training in line with the suggestions made by Manuel Sacristán of «a level of exercise of thinking» based on the specific field and activity inherent to that group of legal practitioners.

The concepts linked in the title of this paper are not specifically included in the lexicon of Principia iuris. However they refer neatly to two basic notions of the constitutional rule of law state: the substantial dimension of democracy and the essential role played by institutions of safeguard, clearly separate from institutions of government on the basis of its source of legitimacy, its function and the way they operate. This distinction leads FERRAJOLI to rethink in depth the public sphere, particularly as regards the understanding of the traditional principle of separation of powers, which is necessary in orden to explain the institutional complexity of this model of state. ; Los conceptos asociados en el título no se hallan, formalmente, en el léxico de Principia iuris, pero remiten con claridad a dos momentos centrales del Estado constitucional de Derecho: la dimensión sustancial de la democracia y el papel esencial de las instituciones de garantía, como netamente separadas de las de gobierno, por razón de su fuente de legitimación, de su función y de su modo de operar. La distinción, lleva a FERRAJOLI a un replanteamiento profundo de la esfera pública, sobre todo, del modo de entender la tradicional división de poderes, necesario para dar cuenta de la complejidad institucional de este modelo de Estado.

La cuestión del embrión: entre el derecho y la moral